In the literature related to the study of sport, the idea of phenomenology appears with various meanings. The aim of this paper is to sketch the nature, methods and central concepts of phenomenology, and thereby to distinguish philosophical phenomenology from its empirical applications. We shall begin by providing an overview of what we think phenomenology is and is not, by introducing the following points: we distinguish phenomenology from phenomenalism; the ontological from the ontic; transcendental subjectivity from subjectivity; phenomenology from phenomenography; (...) and phenomenology from other kinds of empirical qualitative methodology. Next, we examine the two most important British studies to include overviews of phenomenological work in relation to sociology of sport. We then take a critical view of the work of one research paper that gives a particularly clear description of the method of ?empirical phenomenology?. Throughout, we insist on the simple basics: that phenomenology is not simply the study of empirical phenomena, is not a form of subjectivism, is not about someone's personal experience or personal perspective, and that it is not to be confused with ?qualitative research methods?. We further insist that, if a researcher wishes to use the name ?phenomenology? for his or her research, he or she should explain just what it is (about the method or the concepts, or the outcomes) that informs or results from the research programme, in order to justify the name. (shrink)

This paper explores the topic of movement in relation to the human being (anthropos). This topic will be presented from the point of view of phenomenology and related to the area of sport. Firstly, I shall briefly present a description of the human being as static, within which mechanistic, physical movement is ascribed to the body. Secondly, I shall present a different conception of the human being ? the human being as movement ? using a phenomenological approach to the human (...) being based on the early work of Martin Heidegger, and on the philosophy of Jan Pato?ka, highlighting some of their ideas most closely related to the existence of the human being and the exploration of the topic of human movement. I shall refer to this concept of the human being with a word that I have coined for the purpose, uniting the human being (anthropos) and movement (kinesis) ? kinanthropos. Finally, from this phenomenological account of movement, I shall suggest some indicators for the enrichment of our thinking about sport. (shrink)

This paper is based on the work of Pierre de Coubertin and his view of Olympism. It deals with Coubertin's distinction between two kinds of sport: Olympic sport and world championship sport. I shall examine these two possibilities with respect both to education through sport and to how one lives one's life, and I shall show the necessity of choosing between them, with reference to Coubertin's closing remarks in his speech at the 1925 Olympic Congress in Prague: ?Fair or temple (...) ? sportsmen must make their choice; they cannot expect to frequent both one and the other ? let them choose!? (Coubertin 2000f, 559). I shall address the topic of the choice between these two kinds of sport through the two metaphors in the above quotation: ?fair?, in the sense of a market, or in ancient Greek agora; and ?temple?. Since this is also a choice of the way one lives one's life, the ideas will be worked out from within the philosophy of existence, particularly from the work of Jan Pato?ka, who develops the idea of different ?movements of human existence? in connection with different overall life directions that one might follow. The notion of ?fair? (or agora) is characterised by a human being's following of the prevailing patterns, norms and aims prescribed by society, without much reflection upon his or her individual aims and attitudes. It is described in Heideggerian terms as inauthenticity and in Pato?ka's idea of the second life movement, which is characterised by work, struggle, competition, comparisons, endless striving and self-assertion. Within sport, this is represented by wanting to win at all costs, lack of respect, self-promotion and striving for rewards. The notion of ?temple? is contrasted with the above mentioned character of the fair and is related to a certain clarity about one's existence and striving, one's doing and thinking, as described in Pato?ka's third movement of existence. Within the context of sport this is instantiated as a kind of self-development based on self-understanding and critical reflection, and it is illustrated by Olympism and Olympic sport. (shrink)

Transplantation is a medically successful and cost-effective way to treat people whose organs have failed--but not enough organs are available to meet demand. T. M. Wilkinson explores the major ethical problems raised by policies for acquiring organs. Key topics include the rights of the dead, the role of the family, and the sale of organs.

Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follows, I argue that it (...) does not. The cases that cause problems for the supplementation principle for grounding also serve as counterexamples to another principle, minimality, defended by Paul Audi. (shrink)

A very clear and powerfully argued defence of a most important and surprisingly neglected view."--Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford. "If Dr. Olson is right, we are living animals and what goes on in our minds is wholly irrelevant to questions about our persistence through time....[Should] transform philosophical thinking about personal identity."--Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame.

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I (...) distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject. (shrink)

Neuroscience cannot and should not be allowed to replace normative questions with scientific onesOver the past few years considerable attention has been paid to a variety of issues that are now placed collectively under the heading of “Neuroethics”. In both the academic and the popular press there have been discussions about the possibilities and problems offered by cognitive enhancement and neuroimaging as well as debate about the implications of these emerging “neurotechnologies” for morality and the law. This issue of the (...) journal contains eight papers that discuss a broad range of important topics in neuroethics, from cognitive enhancement and the moral status of animals and cyborgs, to the challenges of neurological consults in end of life cases. As these papers demonstrate, advances in neuroscience raise a number of important ethical questions, but can neuroscience help provide any answers?FACT AND VALUEAccording to the received philosophical wisdom, there is a fundamental distinction between fact and value—between how things are and how they ought to be. On the basis of this distinction one cannot draw normative conclusions from descriptive premises because there is nothing in the premises that would warrant such conclusions: from the fact that happiness is desired it does not follow that it ought to be. This received wisdom applies to neuroethics in the following way: whereas neuroscience might be able to identify the neurophysical correlates for evaluative notions such as preferences and attitudes,1,2 lying,3 and the distinction between in control and out of control behaviour,4 neuroscience cannot, in and by itself, provide the basis for their evaluation. The reason for this is that, in the absence of factors external to these neurophysical states, one neurophysical state is no better or worse than another—internal neurophysical states are logically …. (shrink)

It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an (...) exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

Classical text on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy; with Āloka Sanskrit commentary.

Critical edition with eight commentaries, on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Classical work on the basic concepts and terminology of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika school in Hindu philosophy; includes Phakkikā commentary by Kṣamākalyāṇagaṇi, 18th cent.

Aphoristic work on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy; includes Sanskrit commentary with Hindi translation.

Aphoristic work on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy; includes two Sanskrit commentaries.

Discourses on the Bhagavadgītā, Bhakti, and Hindu ethics.

Contributed research papers on Indic philosophy.

Medical Ethics, to quote the authors, is intended as a practical introduction to the ethical questions doctors and other health professionals meet. The book is divided into three main sections, Foundations, Clinical ethics and Medicine and society; each section is further subdivided into topics dealt with in a single chapter. The first section deals very well with the basic background and theories of ethics and does not lay too much stress on the well established “four principles” (chs 1 and 2). (...) I have rarely read such a seamless introduction to the underlying principles of medical ethics and teachers would do well to read this. Later chapters in this …. (shrink)

This book gives a general survey of political thought from Homer to the beginning of the Christian era. To the evidence of the philosophers is added that of Herodotus, Euripides, Thucydides, Polybius and others whose writings illustrate the course of Greek political thinking in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. This re-issues the second, updated edition of 1967.